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WHY BE MORAL?
December 2, 1976
A Journal Entry
Case One: Why should
someone rationally desire to sacrifice himself for others? (E.g., the
soldier and the grenade).
Case Two: If someone were to find the
"Ring of Gyges," what reason would he have not to take advantage of it?
(See excerpt, below)
Concerning the first case, Hobbes gives as
a good start, but merely this. It is to the advantage of all that each be so
conditioned and trained that they would be altruistic and self-sacrificing
at tines of trial and moral temptation. Thus, paradoxically, it becomes a
natter of rational self-interest to submit to a system of education
(indoctrination?) that will produce persons that will be motivated to cat
fear others, despite great temptation and trial. (Cf.Michael Scriven. Bill
Whisner [University of Utah, Philosophy] objects to this). But am I saying
that one should be conditioned to act in such a way that he might not
reasonably act if her were looking after himself'? Am I perhaps begging the
moral point here? Am I, perhaps, bringing in Plato's "noble lie" that
motivates the soldiers in battle? But onward. (77730).
So this is not, as Hobbes describes it,
simply a case of giving up some freedom in exchange for greater freedom (or
security); this is a case of submitting to training and conditioning so
that, in time of great trial, one surrenders the freedom to be a coward for
the sake of social benefit (i.e., living in a community oaf individuals
willing to sacrifice for the good of all).
Now there seems to be a paradox here, If a
person is strongly conditioned to sacrifice himself for the good of the
group -- if, in fact, he is sufficiently conditioned that he "could not do
otherwise" -- then the act is not free and, if not free, not moral.
In other words, at the moment of
self-sacrifice, the individual "has no choice" – he would actually prefer to
make the sacrifice than be a coward, because he has (tacitly at least),
agreed to the bargain whereby any member would, if faced with such a
condition, make the sacrifice.
Consider now the "Ring of Gyges case: The
moral person is a person who is so conditioned that he simply will not take
advantage of the ring. Now if this were strictly a matter of conditioning,
this would not be a moral issue. The moral issue arises when one proposes
that persons should be conditioned to accept self-sacrifice -- i.e., that it
is desirable that people be so trained that, given the Ring of Gyges, they
would not take advantage of it. In other words, if we say that one will
follow his conscience and not be immoral if faced with an opportunity to get
away with an immoral act, then to say that he was conditioned not to be
immoral does not explain why he should not be immoral. However, we can
correctly ask: "Why should one be so conditioned?" Why should such and such
be the curriculum and aim of his moral education? On this ground we can
raise the normative question. We can say that it is good that men be raised
to act morally and prepared four self-sacrifice, and this can be argued on
Hobbesian terms: i.e., that a community of individuals so instructed and
thus equipped with such a conscience, is a better community for each to live
in. Thus we arrive at the moral paradox: It is to the best advantage of
individuals not to act directly to their personal advantage. (Cf. Garrett
Hardin). This applies, of course, to everyday life, not solely to extreme
cases such as the "Gyges" and "grenade" paradigms.
Of course, I have not offered an argument
here as to why. it is better to live in a community of moral altruists. For
this I would want to introduce a "good reasons" justification of the moral
point of view.
[Later: As I have posed the Gyges
question in class, another justification for morality has developed: "the
management argument." This is an elaboration of the old maxim, "a liar
has to keep track of all his lies, while an honest person need only keep
track of the truth." So even if Gyges did his evil deeds while
invisible, he might be unable to "manage" his deceits. Much
elaboration due here, of course. (2009)]
December 23, 1976
"OUGHT IMPLIES CAN" -- BUT . . . A Problem in
Ethical Theory
Consider a person faced with a moral
temptation --,e.g., an opportunity to steal with no chance whatever of
detection, or again a case where lying would be of great persona. selfish
advantage and there is no danger whatever of being caught in the lie (the
Ring of Gyges example). Of course, I am simply asking again. "Why be moral?"
Now it seems to be a matter, of moral duty
not only to do the "right thing" under these circumstances, but one should
also develop habits and conduct oneself in such a way that doing the moral
thing becomes automatic, or, if a matter of deliberation, right conduct is
nevertheless inevitable -- i.e., because of upbringing, conscience,
convictions, habits, or whatever, one is the sort of person for whom it is,
practically speaking, impossible to act wrongly. Such a person, is would
say, is moral or "virtuous." And yet, and here is the paradox, it would seem
that he is determined, that is to say, not free -- "he can not do
otherwise." But what is the problem? "Ought implies can" to be sure. But if
he must, then clearly he can: The problem, however, is that the full formula
should read: "ought implies can and yet might not." This last clause (the
less-than-inevitability condition) does not apply in the preceding
condition.
I would suggest the following resolution.
"Being moral" is an ambiguous phrase which may apply either to an action or
to an achievement. Interpreted as an achievement, a moral "choice" displays,
virtues -- virtues, moreover, that are the result of the person deciding
(tacitly, perhaps) that he intends to become the sort of person for whom an
immoral choice is practically (but not logically) impossible. This is, of
course, an ideal; yet, if the person directs the conduct of his moral
education effectively every attempt he sakes to achieve this ideal of
incorruptibility is a choice-situation wherein he freely chooses to become
incorruptible.1
Upon achieving this ideal status, then to say that he is "moral" is not to
say that the act was moral (in the sense of displaying a free choice to do
right), but rather that the act displayed virtue -- i.e., that it was the
act of a moral person. The moral approbation applies, not to the act, but to
the achievement of conscience and will in the person.
Looking at this another way, one might say
that a person may be so morally trained and has a sufficiently strong
conscience that it is impossible, in fact, that he commit an immoral act.
Nonetheless, one might say that "ought implies can and yet might not" in the
sense that there are empirically conceivable and technically possible
options. Now, in the case of our moral exemplar, his personality is such
that it is "impossible" for him to do wrong. But the contingency resides in
the circumstance viewed objectively. -- not from the point of view of his
will and conscience. I.e., this is a situation in which certain less
exceptional individuals could act several different ways, some of them
contrary to moral duty. In other words, there are several courses of action
which are empirically possible and consistent with the physical conditions
and mental capabilities of the agent. The impossibility, then, resides, not
in the objective circumstances, but in the character of the individual. It
is, after all, the character that receives moral, praise or blame, not the
objective circumstances. In short, the possibility lies in the objective
circumstance; the impossibility lies in the moral character.
(This resolution, I seem to recall, is
similar to Kant’s treatment of "the antinomy of freedom").
April, 1977
Jock Glidden [a Weber State colleague]
asks: What might be the difference between game-playing and the rationale of
morality?
How about this:
a) Game Playing is (often) competitive
behavior set in a broader context of cooperation. (I.e., agreement to
play according to the rules).
b) Morality is cooperative behavior in
a broader context of competition. (Cf. Hobbes and the state of nature
and Rawls (Chapter 1) on competing interests in a state of moderate
scarcity.
Of course, there is much more to be said
in answer to the question. But this is, I believe, a significant ingredient
of the answer.
Excerpt from "The Ring of Gyges" --. The
Republic of Plato
. . . we imagine two men, one just,
the other unjust, given full licence to do whatever they like, and then
follow them to observe where each will be led by his desires. We shall
catch the just man taking the same road as the unjust; he will be moved
by self-interest, the end which it is natural to every creature to
pursue as good, until forcibly turned aside by law and custom to respect
the principle of equality.
Now, the easiest way to give them that
complete liberty of action would be to imagine them possessed of the
talisman found by Gyges, the ancestor of the famous Lydian. The story
tells how he was a shepherd in the King's service. One day there was a
great storm, and the ground where his flock was feeding was rent by an
earthquake. Astonished at the sight, he went down into the chasm and
saw, among other wonders of which the story tells, a brazen horse,
hollow, with windows in its sides. Peering in, he saw a dead body, which
seemed to be of more than human size. It was naked save for a gold ring,
which he took from the finger and made his way out. When the shepherds
met, as they did every month, to send an account to the King of the
state of his flocks, Gyges came wearing the ring. As he was sitting with
the others, he happened to turn the bezel of the ring inside his hand.
At once he became invisible, and his companions, to his surprise, began
to speak of him as if he had left them. Then, as he was fingering the
ring, he turned the bezel outwards and became visible again. With that,
he set about testing the ring to see if it really had this power, and
always with the same result: according as he turned the bezel inside or
out he vanished anal reappeared. After this discovery he contrived to be
one of the messengers sent to the court. There he seduced the Queen, and
with her help murdered the King and seized the throne.
Now suppose there were two such magic
rings, and one were given to the just man, the other to the unjust. No
one, it is commonly believed, would have such iron strength of mind as
to stand fast in doing right or keep his hands off other men's goods,
when he could go to the market-place and fearlessly help himself to
anything he wanted, enter houses and sleep with any woman he chose, set
prisoners free and kill men at his pleasure, and in a word go about
among men with the powers of a god. He would behave no better than the
other; both would take the same course. Surely this would be strong
proof that men do right only under compulsion; no individual thinks of
it as good for him personally, since he does wrong whenever he finds he
has the power. Every man believes that wrongdoing pays him personally
much better, and, according to this theory, that is the truth. Granted
full licence to do as he liked, people would think him a miserable fool
if they found him refusing to wrong his neighbors or to touch their
belongings, though in public they would keep up a pretense of praising
his conduct, for fear of being wronged themselves.
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