Traditional environmental ethical theories and policy
practices are based upon the assumption that natural ecosystems are
balanced, integrated, stable and in equilibrium. Recently, several
ecologists and some philosophers have subjected this assumption to
severe criticism. That criticism bears grave and far-reaching
implications for environmental ethics and policy. For example,
wilderness management practices, the Endangered Species Act, the
Global Warming Treaty, sustainable development, food and agricultural
aid, population policy, pollution control regulation -- all this and
more rest upon assumptions that human welfare depends upon the
maintenance of a fragile ecosystemic "integrity," "balance" and
"equilibrium." All these assumptions are challenged by "the new
ecology."
The essential task of this research project will be three
fold: (1)
a). To examine and clarify the meaning of the concepts
and therefore the claims of both the "new" and the "old"
ecologists - thus determining just what is, and is not, entailed
by these claims.
b). To examine the methodology of both contending schools of
ecology, and to assess the adequacy of the evidence and the
strength of inference offered in support of their claims.
c). On the basis of (a) and (b) to articulate the implications
(if any) of the new ecology for ethical theories and policy
practices that are based upon the concepts and assumptions of "the
old ecology."
Putting this in the simplest of terms, we will ask of "the new
ecology:" (a) What does it mean? (b) Should we believe it? And
(c) What does it matter, and what should be done?
THE
ISSUE
"A thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity,
stability and beauty of the biotic community; it is wrong when it
tends otherwise." This maxim by Aldo Leopold is arguably the most
frequently quoted sentence to appear in the literature of
environmental ethics and policy since its publication a half-century
ago. Indeed, the central concepts of that maxim -- the integrity and
stability of nature, along with the related concepts of ecosystemic
balance and equilibrium -- stand as the unquestioned foundations of
most of that literature.
These are old and venerable ideas, expressed eloquently by George
Perkins Marsh, over a century ago: "Nature, left undisturbed, so
fashions her territory as to give it almost unchanging permanence of
form, outline, and proportion, except when shattered by geologic
convulsions; and, in these comparatively rare cases of derangement,
she sets herself at once to repair the superficial damage, and to
restore, as nearly as practicable, the former aspect of her
dominion." (Marsh, 29)
Other prominent "old paradigm" ecologists are Arthur Tansley (who
coined the term "ecosystem" in 1935, though the concept precedes him
by several decades), Frederick Clements (who developed the concepts
of "ecological succession" and "climax community"), Raymond Pearl,
Alfred Lotka (who developed a mathematical model of equilibrium),
Charles Elton, and Eugene and Howard Odum (about which, much more
later). From Eugene Odum, we have one of the most widely quoted and
influential "old paradigm" definitions of ecosystem: "...any ...
natural unit that includes living and nonliving parts interacting to
produce a stable system in which the exchange of materials between
the living and nonliving parts follows circular paths is an
ecological system or ecosystem. The ecosystem is the largest
functional unit in ecology, since it includes both organisms (biotic
communities) and abiotic environment, each influencing the properties
of the other and both necessary for maintenance of life as we have it
on the earth." (1953, p. 9).
In stark contrast, an emerging and influential school of
contemporary ecologists claim that these concepts are inapplicable to
natural ecosystems, and thus the resulting ethical theories and
policies are false and misguided. Accordingly, this claim of "the new
ecologists" (as we shall call them ) puts in peril the foundations of
much of a half-century of philosophical, moral, political,
journalistic, and legal contention regarding humanity's
responsibility to nature. ("New ecology" is a term that I will employ
in this narrative for a point of view also described as "the new
paradigm" and "disequilibrium ecology" by Pickett, 1992, and
"disturbance ecology" by Woods, 1998).
The challenge of "the new ecology" is articulated with admirable
clarity by the conservation biologist, Michael Soulé: "... the
idea that species live in integrated communities is a myth... Living
nature is not equilibrial... [N]ature at the level of local
biotic assemblages has never been homeostatic." (1995, p. 143)
Donald Worster concurs: "Over the past two decades the field of
ecology has pretty well demolished Eugene Odum's portrayal of a world
of ecosystems tending toward equilibrium, leaving us with no model of
development for human society to emulate." (1992, p. 72).
Also Pickett, Parker and Fiedler (1992): "the classical paradigm
in ecology, with its emphasis on the stable state, its suggestion of
natural systems as closed and self-regulating, and its resonance with
the nonscientific idea of the balance of nature, can no longer serve
as an adequate foundation for conservation. The new paradigm, with
its recognition of episodic events, openness of ecological systems
and multiplicity of locus and kind of regulation, is in fact a more
realistic basis for conservation planning and management." (p.
84).
Daniel Botkin, a leader of "the new ecology," strikes at the very
heart of "traditional ecological wisdom," which he thus describes
(and rejects): "... nature undisturbed by human influence is
characterized by a certain kind of harmony, balance and order...
[W]ilderness is presumed to have three attributes: (1) ...
[it] remains in a constant state; (2) when disturbed and then
left to its own devices, wild nature returns to that original
state..., and (3) finally, an ethic is attached to this natural state
[which is] assumed to be preferable to all others."
This is a crucially important belief, writes Botkin, for "this
view of nature is espoused in textbooks on ecology and in popular
environmental literature. It is the basis of twentieth century
scientific theory about populations and ecosystems. It is the basis
of our Federal and state laws and international agreements that
control our use of wild lands and wild creatures."
Nonetheless, Botkin insists, this view is "wrong!" He writes:
"Essentially all biological records for long-term histories of wild
populations and wilderness ecosystems are in contradiction of this
view. Populations of wild creatures and entire wilderness ecosystems
are characterized by change rather than constancy." (1981, p. 1).
While there are many additional disequilibrium ecologists, space
constraints require us to limit our example to these four. (Among the
others, cf. in the References, M. Davis, Hobbs and Huenneke,
Simberloff, Stevens, Tarlock ).
A Cautionary Note: The space requirements of this proposal
also force an oversimplification of concepts and positions and a
suggestion of polarization of positions in a scientific field
(ecology) that is better described as a spectrum than a dichotomy of
views. While this simplification can not be avoided, I wish to assure
the reader that I am quite aware of elaborations and subtleties that
I can not detail here. However, it is worth nothing (as the above
quotations indicate) that many proponents on the "disequilibrium" end
of the "spectrum" (e.g., Botkin, Pickett, Soulé, and Worster)
do not hesitate to draw attention to strong points of contention
between their positions, and those of traditional (i.e., "old")
ecologists. Accordingly, we will give special attention to those who
see themselves as "revolutionaries" overturning an established
"paradigm" (cf. Kuhn, 1970) - i.e., those who contend that "the old
paradigm" is a "myth" (Soulé), "[an inadequate]
foundation for conservation" (Pickett, et al.), "in contradiction" of
biological data (Botkin) and therefore "pretty well demolished"
(Worster).
Some philosophers have recently joined the biologists' criticism
by launching against "the old ecology," some devastating ammunition
from the armory of analytic philosophy and the philosophy of science.
That attack, by undermining the basic tenets of "the old ecology"
(i.e., ecosystemic integrity, stability, and balance) provides
explicit support to the new. Prominent among these critics is Mark
Sagoff who contends that the old (he calls it "theoretical") ecology
is not, strictly speaking, a "science" at all. Conspicuous among his
criticisms are the following:
-
The principles of theoretical ecologists can not predict
and are not falsifiable, and thus, by implication, they are
not confirmable and thus are devoid of scientific significance.
(1997, p 888)
-
"Ecosystems" are, in fact, devoid of
system.
Put bluntly, "the terms 'eco' and 'system,' when conjoined,
constitute an oxymoron." (923) This is because "the ecosystem as
an object of scientific inquiry is just a pointless hodgepodge of
constantly changing associations of organisms and environments"
(901), and thus "the concept of ecosystem refers to nothing
whatsoever because no stable state, strategy or development or
equilibrium exist to provide terms by which to define
'ecosystem.'" (924n) (No biologists of the "new paradigm" that I
have encountered, go as far as Sagoff in this rejection of
"system" in ecology. In fact, it is difficult to imagine how they
could do so).
-
Ecology lacks a classification system.
-
It follows that ecology lacks "baselines," -- norms
from which to assess deviations.
-
-"There are no general truths about ecosystem organization
... anything is possible consistent with the laws of physics
in nature." Note the policy implications: "If ecosystems are
unstructured, transitory, and accidental in nature, it would seem
to follow that no general economic or utilitarian grounds exist
for protecting them from change." (931-2)
Joining Sagoff's challenge to the scientific legitimacy of ecology
are K. S. Shrader-Frechette (a philosopher) and E. D. McCoy (a
biologist), who argue that ecology fails as grand and comprehensive
theory, since it can not predict events, nor can it explain
deductively -- i.e., "down" from general theory to particular events.
They observe that "... ecologists have defined and used two of the
concepts most basic to community ecology -- "community" and
stability" -- in ambiguous and often inconsistent ways... Ecologists
are likewise divided on what structures communities or holds them
together." Accordingly, they argue, we are thus best advised to
confine our ecological attention to empirical "natural -history
knowledge" and "individual case studies." [8]
R. V. O'Neill and his associates (1986, p. 3) suggest a third view
which we find attractive; namely, that the apparent "opposition"
between old and new ecologies may turn out to be little more than
alternate examinations of opposite sides of one coin. Or, to change
the image, a "half-empty" vs. "half-full" assessment of the same
"glass." Elements of each position can be found in the opposition.
For example, the "old" ecologists have always noticed change and
patches, and generally treat "climax stage" and "equilibrium" as
"ideal types," nowhere perfectly exemplified in nature. For their
part, the "new" ecologists acknowledge limits to ecosystemic response
and the interdependence of life forms in a bio-region. As O'Neill et
al observe, "Our conclusions are biased by the way we observe
ecosystems. For example, if we focus on interactions among individual
organisms, ecosystems seem relatively constant backgrounds, contexts
within which the interesting phenomena occur. If we focus on
succession, ecosystems appear to change continuously through time. In
fact, both impressions are correct, depending on the purpose and the
time-space scale of our observations."
The implications for public environmental policy of "the new
ecology" and its criticisms of the old ecology are profound. If
"disequilibrium ecology" is correct, then it is difficult to find a
justification for wilderness preservation, and still more difficult
for wilderness restoration. For if ecosystems are in constant but
aimless flux, then attempts to "preserve" (i.e., protect from change)
an allegedly "pristine" state, are "contrary to nature." And
proposals to "restore" wilderness raises the question, "restore to
what condition?" If no definable "baseline" condition describes
"wilderness," then that question has no answer and thus "restoration"
policy has no foundation or meaning. Finally, endangered species
legislation loses its justification for extinction is of no great
practical significance. After all, it is suggested, nature has proven
itself to be wondrously redundant, and if one species is lost, there
is an abundance of others to take its place. There is no "balance" to
be upset, or "system" to be disrupted by an alteration of the content
of an ecosystem.
"The new ecologists" support their position with a wealth of
empirical data, years of assessment and interpretation of that data,
and with the advantages of critical hindsight upon the classical
"equilibrium" theories which preceded them. "The old ecology,"
apparently vague and oversimplified, should not and will not stand
unaffected by these criticisms. But those who proclaim a Kuhnian
"paradigm shift" (the extreme end of spectrum of opinion, let us
recall) are also due for a scrupulous critical examination. The
aforementioned policy implications (which we will detail in the final
section) are both practical and momentous, dealing with issues of
population control, wilderness management, biodiversity and
extinction, agricultural practices, and bio-resource research,
development and investment. Rarely does one encounter a scientific
controversy with clearer and more compelling stakes.
The essential task of this research project will be threefold:
a). To examine and clarify the meaning of the concepts
and therefore the claims of both the "new" and the "old"
ecologists - thus determining just what is, and is not, entailed
by these claims.
b). To examine the methodology of both contending schools of
ecology, and to assess the adequacy of the evidence and the
strength of inference offered in support of their
claims.
c). On the basis of (a) and (b) to articulate the implications
(if any) of the new ecology for ethical theories and policy
practices that are based upon the concepts and assumptions of "the
old ecology".
Putting this in the simplest of terms, we will ask of "the
new ecology:"
a. What does it mean?
b. Should we believe it?
c. What does it matter?
It should be noted that these tasks are iterative - that is,
advancement on the "higher levels" will "feed back" to enrich content
of the lower levels. (This is especially true of levels (a) and (b)).
And yet, this is also a "storied structure." Fact claims (b) rest
upon a vocabulary and analysis of concepts (a), evaluation (c) upon a
basis of facts, and finally sound policy is based upon established
fact and evaluation.
A fundamental assumption of this study is that a sizable portion
of environmental philosophers and policy-makers must come to terms
with the new ecologists. By so doing, they must either, on the one
hand, accept the conclusions of "disequilibrium ecology," which will
entail abandonment or radical revision of these philosophical
theories and policy practices or, on the other hand, they must answer
and refute the challenges of the new ecology with superior
arguments.
In my research, I have found few policy-makers or philosophers who
fully appreciate the significance of "the new ecology" to
environmental ethics and policy. Among the noteworthy exceptions are
Brian Norton, Mark Sagoff, Kristin Shrader-Frechette, Holmes Rolston,
and Baird Callicott - the last of whom has published one of the few
papers that I have encountered that deals directly with the topic of
this proposal. (Callicott, 1996).
We agree with these ecologically informed eco-philosophers that
the encounter between the new ecologists and "mainstream"
environmental ethicists and policy-makers may constitute the most
significant issue to arise in environmental ethics since the
publication of Aldo Leopold's Sand County Almanac, a half century
ago.
THE
PHILOSOPHER'S METHOD
Analytic philosophy is correctly characterized as a "second-order
activity." With regard to ecology and bio-science, this means that
the philosopher studies, not ecosystems, but the study of ecosystems
- i.e., the vocabulary, concepts, presuppositions, methodology and
theoretical structure of eco- and bio-science. The philosopher's data
are not life forms and their functions, but rather what scientists
say and write about these forms and functions. Accordingly:
-
The philosopher's "equipment" is the word (and the ideas
expressed thereby) -- published, unpublished, and spoken -- but in
any case, words articulated as structured argument, and
deliberately aiming at coherence, consistency, clarity, and
scope.
-
The philosopher's "laboratory" is the library and the
colloquium -- and now the e-mail system and the internet.
-
The philosopher's "experiment" is the dialog -- a presentation
of his views before worthy critics, and a scrupulous response
thereto. (Cf. "Equipment," above).
And while a philosopher of science might occasionally visit a
laboratory or a "field," it will not be to study the specimens
therein that engage the attention of the scientists. Instead, the
philosopher's object of inquiry will be the activity and behavior of
the scientists: their methods, their concepts and language, and the
unacknowledged and unexamined presuppositions of their inquiry.
Philosophers have long-since ceased to be rivals of scientists and
now serve as their complements.
Among the more useful activities of critical philosophy is what I
call "excavative analysis" -- the "uncovering" and explication of
presuppositions of scientific hypotheses and theories which, when
brought to light, may be found to be unfounded, or mutually
contradictory, or bearers of implausible implications. A noteworthy
example in physics is the "common sense" assumption that velocity is
additive without limit, and thus that the speed of light can be
exceeded. Einstein's questioning of this assumption led to a
revolution in physics.
A Plan of Investigation. As the NSF guidelines correctly
point out, the promise that "we will review the literature and then
proceed" is a lame and vacuous statement of method. It is also,
unfortunately, quite accurate - as far as it goes (i.e., not very
far). A scrupulous identification of that "literature" is in order,
along with the questions that will guide that "review."
The "literature" in question will be in the fields of ecology
("old" and "new" paradigms), environmental ethics, philosophy of
science, and policy studies.
-
Regarding the "old" or "equilibrium" ecology, we will ask:
"What are the 'target' concepts and theories of traditional
ecology, with which the "new ecologists" take the strongest
exception? How do the "old ecologists" define and use these
concepts (presumably integrity, stability, balance. equilibrium
and system)? When the philosophers argue that "theoretical
ecology" fails such scientific requirements as falsifiability,
baseline concepts, (etc.), just what ecologists and which of their
concepts and theories do the analytic philosophers have in
mind?
-
Regarding "the new (disequilibrium) ecology:" Just who are the
leading exponents? What are the essential elements of their
position? What evidence do they present in support of this
position? How strong is inferential bond between this evidence and
their general conclusions and position. What has been the response
of ecologists, both old and new, to this position and these
arguments?
-
Regarding the philosophical critics and defenders of both of
the above positions: Who are these defenders and critics? What
insights does philosophical analysis add to the controversy? What
do philosophers of science have to say about the legitimacy of the
concepts, methodology and theoretical structure of ecology, old
and new. (In the course of this research, this investigator will,
of course, join the ranks of the "philosophical critics and/or
defenders").
-
Regarding the implications of this debate for environmental
ethics: How might the several "schools" of environmental ethics
come to terms with a hypothetical disestablishment of the old
ecology by the new?
-
Regarding the implications of this debate for environmental
policy: How much of past and present public policy assumes the
desirability (in Leopold's words) of "preserv[ing] the
integrity, stability and beauty of the biotic community"? How much
of this policy could withstand the hypothetical "establishment" of
the "new ecology" in the scientific and academic community? Does
the "new ecology" offer mischievous opportunities for the
political opponents of environmental protection policies? (The
special-interest "use" of so-called "junk science" in defense of
the tobacco industry, or in opposition to global warming policy,
are vivid examples of such "mischief").
This list outlines a program of study, not an anticipation of
results. While our preliminary work inclines us toward some tentative
positions, we are far more cognizant of the vast territory of data,
opinion, conjecture and theory that we have yet to explore before we
can state our as-yet unformulated conclusions with confidence and
cogent argument.
ANALYZING
THE CONCEPTS
As any philosophy teacher will testify, there is a universal
tendency in the general public, and even among sophisticated
scholars, to "see past" linguistic and conceptual disputes and
confusion and to treat all controversy as "matters of fact." For
example, over the three decades of my teaching experience, I have
routinely asked students in my introductory classes such shopworn
puzzles as "which came first, the chicken or the egg?" or "if a tree
falls in the forest, does it make a sound?" Just as routinely, a
lively argument ensued, with each side citing facts which no one
disputes, and with few students pausing to notice that the
controversy turned on nothing more than the meaning of such terms as
"chicken" or "sound."
Without language, human thought and culture, and therefore
philosophy and science, would be impossible. Yet this most
fundamental institution so pervades our lives that it becomes
transparent and even invisible to our ordinary thought processes.
This tendency to "see past" conceptual issues has far more than
pedagogical significance: in fact, it confounds most legal and public
policy debates. Perhaps there is no better example than the issue of
"When does life begin?" which so dominates public debate today. (Cf.
our editorial, "The
Right to Life and the Right to Love").
In the spring of 1981, the late Sen. John East of North Carolina
convened senate hearings on that very question -- "When does human
life begin?" Biologists, physicians, geneticists, legal scholars and
theologians were all brought in to testify; many months of time and
millions of dollars were expended, and a library of testimony
transcript accumulated. At the end, no resolution of the issue was in
sight, and there was little apparent awareness that the issue was not
factual, but conceptual (unintended pun). A journeyman philosopher
might have cut through the verbiage with a few simple questions:
"what facts are in dispute here?" "Just what imaginable sort of
information would answer your question, "when does life begin"? And
if you are not prepared to recognize an answer to the question, then
why ask it? Put simply, just what is it that you are asking anyway?"
(This example is instructive, and we will have occasion to return to
it).
Concept analysis and ecology: As our opening section ("The
Issue") indicates, the dispute between the "old" and "new" ecologies
seems to revolve around a short list of concepts: integrity,
stability, balance, equilibrium and system. How much of
the dispute is over "the facts" of ecosystems -- their components,
structure, function and development -- and how much over the analysis
of these fundamental concepts, and of their function in theory
formation?
The ontological status of concepts is surely one of the deepest
and most intractable issues in analytic philosophy. Fortunately, it
can also be bypassed (as it must in this proposal). Let this much
suffice: concepts appear to be objects of cognition - (roughly,
"meanings"). Yet they are not simply objects of mind, since concepts
are both discovered and invented. (Question: did the concept of
"square root" exist before minds evolved?). Neither are concepts
linguistic entities: one word or phrase can designate many concepts
(it's called "ambiguity"), and many words can designate a single
concept (e.g., "sister" and "female sibling," or "freedom,"
"liberté," "freiheit," "svoboda"). And most amazing of all, we
are quite able to use words and communicate with full understanding,
and yet be quite unable to analyze the concepts to which they refer.
For example, the words "justice," "beauty," "courage," "piety," are
all employed without difficulty in normal conversation, yet Plato's
Dialogs - and all succeeding philosophy - testify to the difficulty
in defining these words.
That task of definition - more precisely, of identification of the
concepts referred to - is the work of the analytic philosopher. (Not
to be confused with the work of the lexicographer - a "sociologist of
language" who reports how words are actually used). While concept
analysis is a multifaceted occupation, space constraints permit
mention of only two primary and interrelated aspects thereof: the
search for criteria, and the determination of boundaries of
application.
"Criteria" (also called "defining characteristics") are sine
qua non qualities which must be present for the term to be
applicable to its referent: e.g., unmarried in the case of
"bachelor," three-sided in the case of "triangle". Individual
criteria are normally understood to be necessary conditions of
application, though the goal of concept analysis is to collect
several criteria which, together, are sufficient for
application. (2) While the explication
of criteria seems to be a straightforward task, it has proven to be
devilishly difficult throughout the history of philosophy (cf. The
Dialogs of Plato).. Two contemporary examples are illustrative: "What
do I mean when I say that 'I know something (X)'?" One of the most
prominent (but still controversial) philosophical analyses of
knowledge concludes that knowledge is "justified true belief: i.e.,
that the analysis of "I know X" is as follows - (a) "I believe X,"
(b) "I have justification for this belief," and (c) "X is true."
(Ayer, 1954). The "thought experiment" that validates this analysis
combines a vain attempt to imagine an item of knowledge that lacks
one of the three criteria, along with a failed attempt to identify a
content of mind that meets all criteria ("justified true belief") and
yet is not knowledge. (Try it!)
The second example is a criteria list for the concept of moral
responsibility, that I have developed over the years: "P is
morally responsible for X, if and only if:" (a) P has
knowledge of the consequences of X, (b) P has the
capacity to bring about X, (c) P has the choice not
to bring about X, and (d) X has value significance. (For a
recent application of this concept analysis, cf. Partridge,
1995).
In the "Senator East example," there was no agreed upon concept
analysis (criteria list) of "human life," and thus it was not
possible to arrive at a mutually agreeable answer to (or even to make
sense of) the question, "when does human life begin?" Thus the issue
involved neither facts, science, ethics, or theology - just "words."
By failing to address the conceptual analysis, the Senate Committee
was unable to complete its investigation - because, of course, it was
unable even to begin its investigation. And yet the hearings went on,
as if no one were aware of this elementary obstacle.
Criteria and Ecology: In ecological science, the contest
between the "old" and "new" paradigms is joined as to whether
bio-regions (3) contain "ecosystems,"
and if so, whether these systems "tend" toward "climax" stages that
are stable, in equilibrium, and capable, when disturbed, of
recovering and returning to these "optimum conditions" of ecosystemic
"integrity" and "health."
It won't do simply to "go out there and look." Not if the
investigators do not know, beforehand, what they are looking for. Not
unless these key concepts - ecosystem, equilibrium, stability,
integrity, bio-community - are analyzed and defined with sufficient
clarity can their presence or absence be determined through empirical
examination. Such analyses of these key concepts of ecology were not
conspicuous in my reading of the classical and the recent ecological
literature. (4)
The boundaries of application of a concept are closely associated
with its criteria, and with the falsification rule. If a scientific
term, or an expression in ordinary language for that matter, is to
have a clear meaning, one must not only know what it refers to, but
also (at least implicitly) what it does not refer to. Thus, for
example, the meaning of "democracy" is enriched by our appreciation
of its absence - tyranny. In science, the boundaries of terms are
clearly enunciated by their opposites and alternates:
organic/inorganic, igneous/sedimentary/metamorphic,
positive/negative, and so on. This clarity of meaning follows
directly from an explication of criteria: the absence of a criterion
indicates a boundary of meaning and application. For example, if our
analysis of the concept of knowledge is valid, an idea that lacks
justification, or truth or belief, is an idea that can not be said to
be "known." Analogously, an organism that receives its nourishment
from living organic matter is clearly distinguished from an autotroph
or a saprophage. Clear criteria of meaning tells us both what a term
does and does not refer to.
The use of terms without boundaries of application constitutes
what Passmore (1969, Ch. 6) calls "the fallacy of excluded
opposites." Three examples, much appreciated by teachers of
Introductory Philosophy, are "psychological egoism," "hard
determinism" and "subjective idealism." The first claims that "all
voluntary human action is selfish, including the acts of all saints
and heroes," the second that "no human actions are free," and the
third that "all that exists are minds and their ideas -matter is an
idea without meaning." The standard criticism of all three is that by
setting no boundaries to the application of the terms "selfish acts,"
"unfree acts," and "ideas of minds," the proponents of these
doctrines exclude a priori (i.e., by stipulated definition)
the logical possibility of refutation. In other words, all three
doctrines are non-falsifiable in principle. This can be readily seen
as we ask: "assuming you are correct, what would it be like for your
assertions to be false? What would it be like to encounter
(respectively) an unselfish act, a free act, or a material object?"
The standard criticism continues that there is no answer to these
questions, because falsification has been ruled out by definition,
not because the facts of human nature, nor of the nature of ultimate
reality. Thus "psychological egoism," "hard determinism" and
"subjective idealism" are devoid of meaning. (The intuitive
plausibility of these doctrines is accomplished through equivocation
- i.e., by using the familiar words, "selfish," "free," "matter" in
unfamiliar ways).
Boundaries of application, falsification and ecology: Is
"the old ecology" similarly meaningless? If all "mature natural
ecosystems" (i.e., in "climax") "tend toward" a state of
"equilibrium," what would it be like to encounter a mature and
undisturbed natural community that does not "tend toward
equilibrium"? But is it not possible that close analysis will
disclose that the concept of "ecological equilibrium" is a
restatement of the conditions of "mature and undisturbed." If so,
then the claim that "all mature natural ecosystems tend toward
equilibrium" will turn out to be an empty tautology - and thus, of
course, unfalsifiable. (Because "tend toward" is a troublesome
"weasel term" that serves to explain away apparent falsifications,
talk of "tendencies" arouses the suspicions of analytic
philosophers).
Furthermore, when the Odum brothers claim that "mature" ecosystems
"tend" to return to a prior equilibrial state (though never exactly
so), we are entitled to inquire about the nature of the
"self-regulating mechanisms" that allegedly effect this
"return." (5) If these mechanisms
exist, what will we find in nature that is identifiably different
from what we might find if there are no such mechanisms? And if
"ecosystem equilibrium" is an "ideal type," never fully realized in
nature, how much so-called "tendency" must be found to validate the
theory? Physicists have no trouble thus incorporating (physically
nonexistent) "ideal types" such as "absolute zero" or "perfect
vacuum" into their theories. Can ecologists do as well. It clearly
appears that they can not. Why not?
Conversely, when Soulé proclaims the equilibrium model a
"myth," and Pickett announces that this model has been "demolished,"
we are entitled to ask them what we would expect to find in nature
if, contrary to their claims (thus allegedly contrary to fact), they
were wrong, and the Odum brothers were right. In short, are they
prepared to describe "Odum-nature" and then alternatively
"Soulé/Picket-nature" in terms that are discriminably
different, such that empirical field studies and laboratory
experiments can determine which model more accurately describes
nature "as it really is?"
These are not simple empirical questions. In fact, they logically
precede empirical investigation, for, as the Sen. East example
illustrates, one can not go into the field of empirical research
without a prior understanding of what one is looking for, and of what
will and will not validate their hypotheses. Do the "old" and "new"
ecologists, the contestants in this debate, have such an
understanding? The answer is to be found through a careful, "second
order" (philosophical/conceptual), analysis of the vocabulary, the
methodology, and the data base presented in the published work of the
contestants. And that describes the enterprise here proposed.
"Ecosystem:" A sample conceptual analysis: At the core of the
dispute between the old and new paradigms, it seems, is the concept
of "ecosystem," and by implication, the concept of "system." As both
a sample of conceptual analysis, and in anticipation of further
investigation, I would suggest the following criteria: (a) ecosystems
are emergent wholes - which means they possess qualities that are
qualities of none of their component parts. (This is the central
theme of Frank Golley's History (1993)). (b) Ecosystems contain both
biotic and abiotic components, and are characterized by nutrient
recycling and energy flows (E. Odum, 1953 - cf. quotation on p. 1,
above). (c) (At the center of the controversy), ecosystems when
mature, contain negative feedback mechanisms which lend self
regulation and resilience to the system. And finally (for the
moment), (d) ecosystems are systems, which means, at the very least,
that the components accomplish in concert what they cannot accomplish
separately. (In this sense, a football team is a system, and also
that most primitive of binary systems, the thermostat/furnace. Cf. my
"Reconstructing Ecology.").
This analysis escapes the trap of nonfalsifiability, since it is
possible to imagine a collection of biota that is not an ecosystem:
namely a line of cages in a zoo, or a collection of potted plants.
The question of what types of systems (if any) exist in nature
remains open to empirical investigation. At the extremes (both highly
unlikely) is what we might call the "arbitrary system" suggested by
Sagoff, and at the other, the "super-organic" system suggested by
Clement and the early James Lovelock ("Gaia"). In the "arbitrary
system," species are interchangeable, there are no "keystone
species," and synergisms and symbioses are inconsequential. Within
these extremes are the contending "old" and "new" paradigms, and,
just possibly, the modes of accommodation between them. But again,
that is in issue open to empirical investigation.
THE
WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE
"Step Two," the question of evidence ("why should we believe
this?"), is logically subsidiary to "Step One" ("What does this
mean?"), for without first clearly understanding just what "this"
theory means, we cannot determine just what does or does not count as
evidence.
Even so, a few general principles of scientific investigation that
will guide our investigation are worth mentioning here.
First of all, the critics' complaint that theoretical ecology
lacks an effective classification system, seems to me to be well
founded. Ecology may be at a stage of development similar to that of
biology before Linnaeus, or chemistry before Mendeleev -- an
anecdotal, "case-study" approach that Shrader-Frechette and McCoy
characterize as "natural history." (1993, ch. 5). Still, ecology is
not without some crucially important classification schemes: the
functional distinction between producers, consumers, and decomposers
comes to mind. Are there others? How do they function in ecological
theory construction and investigation? How might these functions be
improved?
A well-considered classification scheme is essential to productive
laboratory and field work, for without it the investigator may be at
a loss as to what to look for. As both scientists and philosophers
have long realized, the ideal of "the completely objective and
unbiased observer" is a myth -- not only impossible, but undesirable
even if possible. All effective scientific observation presupposes
theory, if only a implicit theory of what is and is not relevant to
the investigation. There are no "immaculate perceptions." "Seeing is
seeing as."
The philosopher's task, then, is to identify and explicate the
classification schemes employed by the ecologists, and then to
"analytically excavate" the concepts and theoretical structures that
they presuppose.
Evolution and ecosystems -- a suggestion: The "new
ecologists" and critics of the old deny, in ecosystems, qualities
that they readily acknowledge in organisms: namely, integrated
structures and functions, self-repair mechanisms, goal-oriented
activity, etc. To achieve this conclusion, they are obliged to detach
ecosystems from the mechanism that gave all these qualities to
organisms: organic evolution. It thus follows that a rebuttal by the
old ecology would be well advised to include evidence and an argument
strategy that would establish an integral linkage between organic
evolution and ecosystemic evolution. (I have suggested as much in my
"Reconstructing
Ecology" (1999)) and furthermore that evolution suggests
modes of accommodation between the "two ecologies." And yet the
evolution-ecosystem connection is conspicuously absent in the
discussions that I have read. I hope to have the opportunity to
follow this lead and examine this argument much further.)
Finally, Stuart Pimm (1991) directs our attention to "the
scaling-up problem:" the fact that research ecologists deal, as they
must, with changes over brief periods of time (usually within
five-years), and with communities confined to small areas - e.g., a
pond a meter deep and 14,000 square meters in area (Lindeman, 1941),
a spring in Florida (H. Odum, 1957), or a mountain watershed (Boorman
and Likens, et al, 1974). Yet from such studies they boldly pronounce
on "the state of the world's ecosystem," or "the future of life on
earth." Are such leaps warranted? If so, on what grounds. We eagerly
look forward to searching out the answers - of any.
In Sum: For several decades, environmental philosophers and
activists have regarded the "integrity, stability and beauty" of
nature to be too obvious to merit serious debate. Today, a new
generation of ecologists has challenged these cherished concepts, and
has put in question even the "systemic" nature of ecosystems. Perhaps
the "old paradigm" is correct, and natural ecosystems do have
integrated structures, and evolve mechanisms that "tend" toward
stability and equilibrium. But if so, we no longer can regard this as
"obvious" to the trained observer. On the contrary, these mechanisms
and structures, if they exist, are very subtle and in need of
scrupulous definition and confirming evidence. The "old ecology" may
or may not prevail in this encounter with the "new ecology." My
suspicion is that neither extreme in the spectrum of ecological
opinion will prevail, but that a synthesis will emerge out of this
controversy that will result in a significant advance in the
conceptual vocabulary and theoretical structure of ecological
science. If so, then there must first be a scrupulous review and then
a refinement of the concepts and methods that led to this
confrontation. And that is the task here proposed.
IMPLICATIONS
FOR ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS AND POLICY
We have stated throughout that the implications of the "new"
disequilibrium ecology for environmental ethics and policy are
profound and extensive. The time has come to identify those
implications.
Environmental Ethics: The impact upon
environmental ethics varies with each "school" of that discipline. At
one extreme, "strong anthropocentrists" might welcome the message of
the "new ecologists," and find license in that position to accelerate
the exploitation of nature for human ends. (Simon, Sagoff 1998)
"Animal liberation" approaches might take little note of this
controversy, since they tend to focus more of their attention on the
intrinsic values and rights of individual organisms, rather than the
"life communities" that support these organisms.
By far the gravest implications fall upon "the land ethic"
position of Aldo Leopold and upon "deep ecology," since the presumed
"integrity," "stability" and "balance" of nature -- the so-called
"web of life" -- is the very foundation of these environmental
philosophies. For consider, if life forms are supported, not by an
integrated "system," but rather by a chaotic "hodgepodge," what
remains of Leopold's admonition: "We abuse land because we regard it
as a commodity belonging to us. When we see land as a community to
which we belong, we may begin to use it with love and respect"? What
content remains to his most memorable maxim, which opened this
proposal: "A thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity,
stability, and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it
tends otherwise." (Leopold, viii, 224-5).
Public Policy: As Daniel Botkin suggested in a
passage quoted earlier, the implications for public environmental
policy are no less profound.
Wilderness preservation and renewal. "New ecology" states
that because ecosystems are in constant change, there are no "normal"
or "natural" conditions, and no "climax stage" of ecological
succession. If this is so, then what is to be "preserved" in
so-called wilderness areas? Mark Woods (1997) clearly presents (but
does not endorse) the implications for wilderness policy of "the new
ecology:" "We cannot identify what can harm wilderness because there
is no such thing as a static, baseline wilderness against which harm
can be measured, and we cannot identify what can disturb wilderness
because everything can. Further, it may be impossible to characterize
what wilderness is ... because wilderness is in perpetual
change."
Extinction and the loss of biodiversity.
The generation
now alive is causing an "extinction spasm" to rival that which ended
the Cretaceous period and the end of the age of the dinosaurs
(believed to have been the result of an asteroid collision). E. O.
Wilson believes that unless this "spasm" is halted and reversed,
future generations may judge this loss to be the greatest crime of
this generation against all its successors. (Wilson, 1992, Myers,
1988). "Not to worry," is the clear implication of the "new
ecologists:" As Mark Sagoff observes, "... no extinction of any
species in the United States seems thus far to have altered the
capacity of the ecosystems to provide these services. The reason may
be that for any species that is lost, tens, hundreds, or thousands of
others are ready, willing, and able to perform the same functions and
services valuable to human beings." (1997, 904) And, human beings
aside, "no prima facie, general, or theoretical reason can
be given, then, to suppose that the extinction of species now feared
will in any meaningful way harm nature, because nature, having
neither design or direction, is not the sort of thing that can suffer
harm." (967) (Regarding the biodiversity crisis, Sagoff parts company
with most of the "new ecologists," who are as alarmed and appalled as
most biologists at the current "extinction spasm.")
The limits on the growth of human consumption or population.
With no serious consequences following from the alleged
"disruption of finely tuned and adjusted ecosystems" (since such
"systems" are allegedly neither integrated nor systemic), the only
practical limitation on economic and population growth is human
ingenuity and information. As Julian Simon puts it, "we now have in
our hands -- in our libraries, really -- the technology to feed,
clothe, and supply energy to an ever-growing population for the next
seven billion years... We [are] able to go on increasing
forever." (Simon, 1981, 48). Sagoff (1998) endorses this optimism:
"... technology can deliver greater and greater abundance...,
[and] ... the endless expansion of the global economy is
physically possible." In a recent issue of The Atlantic
Monthly, five traditional ecologists took strong and explicit
exception to Sagoff's optimism, complaining that "he [Sagoff]
has done a disservice to the public by promoting once again the
dangerous idea that technological fixes will solve the human
predicament." (Ehrlich, et. al, 1998. For my position on this issue,
see "Perilous Optimism".
and "How Much is Too Much?").
The sustainability of industrial agriculture. Vast
regions of Europe and Asia have sustained agriculture for several
millennia, and, by continuing traditional methods, can presumably be
sustained indefinitely. This is accomplished through the maintenance
of a robust soil "microecology" -- through the services of what E. O.
Wilson calls, "the little things that run the world." But these
agricultural methods depend upon human and animal labor, and they are
inefficient. The importation of fossil fuel energy to drive farm
machinery, and the use of inorganic chemical fertilizers, greatly
multiplies the per-acre crop yields while eliminating the need for
pasturage. Unconstrained by "old ecological" belief in the
"inscrutable workings" of an allegedly complex, integrated and
balanced soil ecosystems, industrial agronomists, "green
revolutionaries," can claim to have a "better way" to feed a
constantly growing population.
The burden of proof in pollution control. With no
"inscrutably complex life-support system" believed to be imperiled by
our industrial technology, the "precautionary principle" may be set
aside. No longer must the manufacturer prove that his emissions are
safe. It becomes the burden of the government and/or the potential
victims to prove significant risk.
Public and political debate on environmental policy may be
transformed. The publication in scientific and scholarly
journals of the opinion that "the balance of nature," "the web of
life," and "Gaia" are unsupportable popular myths, will be greeted
with enthusiasm by special interests that have been fighting
environmental protection legislation, regulation and policy since the
first Earth Day in 1970. So-called "junk science" (science that is
simplified, unqualified, and distorted to serve rhetorical purposes)
was used for decades to successfully postpone government action
against the health risks of smoking, and it is being employed today
by energy interests to downplay the threat of global warming. The
temptation to similarly degrade and employ "new" ecological theory
will likely prove irresistible to individuals and institutions whose
interests are anything but scientific.
The six "policy implications" of new ecology listed above are, as
presented, oversimplified and vague. They also suggest a "united
front" among new ecologists, which surely does not exist in fact.
(For example, Botkin, Soulé and other "disequilibrium
ecologists," emphatically affirm, contrary to Sagoff, that ecosystems
are in fact complex systems). These "policy implications" are not
"necessary entailments" of "a new ecology platform." After all, we
have not yet prepared a scrupulous explication of "the new ecology,"
and when we do we shall no doubt find, not "a" position, but rather a
variety of points of view expressed by this collection of independent
scholars and scientists. There is not, should not be, and will not
be, a unifying "Credo" of new ecology.
Nevertheless, these six "implications" are all plausible
environmental policy issues that we might expect to encounter in
public debate, as the concepts and positions of "the new ecologists"
-- or rather, the distilled oversimplifications thereof -- become
better known to scholars and their students, to journalists, to the
general public, to legislators, and thus to policy-makers. Wilderness
management, the Endangered Species Act, The Global Warming Treaty,
sustainable development, food and agricultural aid, population
policy, pollution control regulations -- all of these may undergo
reevaluation, if faced by the challenges brought forth by "the new
ecology." No doubt, much of this policy debate will have consequences
that were not expected or intended by the defenders of "the new
ecology" -- indeed, we may fully expect that many of these scholars
and scientists will be appalled by what others will make of their
words and ideas. This problem leads to our final consideration.
EcoScience and Public Policy -- the Concluding Task: As I
have studied the development of ecological science, and the
contending schools within, I have been struck by the gap between the
carefully qualified and contained findings of eco-science, on the one
hand, and the bold pronouncements of "compelling ecological facts and
principles" that are heard in public debates. Often these contrasts
are found within single individuals: scientists speaking "from the
lab bench or the field," on the one hand, and in public and political
fora on the other hand. And while I have been personally and
professional involved with environmental ethics and policy for more
than thirty years, it took the preparations for this proposal to
alert me, as never before, to the gap between scientific advancement
and public pronouncement.
It is a sad but commonplace fact that complex and subtle
scientific findings are winnowed and filtered into gross
simplifications (perhaps necessarily so) before legislators and
administrators can assimilate these findings and apply them to laws
and policies. (Indeed, as noted at the outset, space constraints
force such oversimplification in this proposal). This process is
unavoidable, even with the best of intentions by the policy-makers,
and more often than not their intentions are not "the best." The
problem has been severely aggravated by the abolition of the
Congressional Office of Technology Assessment, cutbacks in
government-sponsored research, and the concurrent rise of journalist
and political "junk science" (i.e., distorted and selected scientific
"data" used for political or commercial advocacy).
Examples of this "filtering and winnowing" are found in attempts
to apply findings of atmospheric sciences to "global warming" policy.
It is also found in the "filtering out" of economists' qualms and
qualifications about cost benefit analysis and market mechanisms
(e.g., "market failures" distributive issues, and "externalities") in
policy guidelines. Finally, closest to our project, we encounter an
uncritical application of classical ecological concepts such as
"balance," "equilibrium," climax community" in environmental policy
and public debates. Thus we are led to ask: Given the limited time,
attention-span and expertise of both public and legislators, what is
the most valid and relevant message that the developing science of
ecology can deliver to public policy makers? This task of linking
eco-science to public policy, will be based and will follow upon our
study of the meaning of ecological concepts and the methodology of
ecological science, and it will occupy our attention following the
formal completion of the NSF grant.
APPENDIX: SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT
(February,
1999)
Clarifications and Amendments:
On the dichotomy between "old" and "new" ecology. The NSF
evaluating panel and some referees raised concern about the
polarization between "old" and "new" ecologies, presented in the
proposal. This is, the Panel notes, a "false dichotomy."
I agree, though it is apparent that I did not make this agreement
sufficiently clear in the proposal. Early in the proposal, I noted
that ecology "is better described as a spectrum than a dichotomy of
views." However, I also pointed out that many contemporary ecologists
on the disequilibrium "edge" of that spectrum (e.g., Botkin, Soule,
Pickett, etc.), took pains to disassociate themselves from what they
variously described as "the old paradigm," "the equilibrium model,"
and "traditional ecological wisdom." The target of their criticism,
at the opposite "edge" of the spectrum, is the popular concept of
natural ecosystems as "balanced," "integrated" and "healthy"
"communities." This latter conception is conspicuous in public
policy, among environmental activists, and in the media, where the
term "balance of nature" is routinely encountered.
Daniel Botkin (1981), a leader among the "disequilibrium
ecologists," could not be more explicit about this polarization:
"There are two contradictory beliefs about wilderness. One assumes
that nature undisturbed by human influence is characterized by a
certain kind of harmony, balance and order. The second assumes that
the essence of wilderness is change. This [first] view of
nature is espoused in textbooks on ecology and in popular
environmental literature. It is the basis of 20th century
scientific theory about populations and ecosystems. It is the basis
of our Federal and state laws..... It is wrong.
This perceived "dichotomy" is not, I believe, supported by the
mainstream of ecological research, concepts and theory. Both "edges"
of the spectrum engage in oversimplifications and "straw man"
caricatures of each other. Even so, the "disequilibrium edge" has
correctly identified oversimplifications and even falsehoods in the
opposite edge - what Botkin calls "traditional ecological wisdom."
And "mainstream" ecological science has further undermined the
conceptual foundations of much public environmental policy and the
public opinion which supports it. Concepts such as "balance of
nature," "natural ecosystems," "life community," "ecosystemic health
and integrity" - lack the scientific solidity they were once believed
to have. Thus established policies of land management, wilderness
preservation, endangered species protection, and so forth, appear to
be vulnerable to reassessment and reevaluation in the light of new
and ongoing developments in ecological science.
What are the evolving concepts and theories of ecological science,
and in contradistinction, of public policy and environmental ethics?
What established public policies and theories of environmental ethics
can withstand the new developments in ecological science? On the
other hand, what revisions of policy and ethics might be entailed by
these new scientific developments? These questions define, in part,
the task of the research here proposed.
Are "wild" and "natural" ecosystems Discovered or
Constructed?
Some of the referees have pointed out a missing dimension from the
proposed study; namely, the question of whether concepts such as
"wildness" and "natural ecosystems" refer to conditions that are
objectively defined and determinable, or whether, on the other hand,
they reflect historical and cultural factors, or even political
agendas. In other words, the issue is whether "wild" and "natural"
ecosystems are "discovered" and identified, or whether they are
"constructed" from our biases and norms. Or (still more likely)
whether such concepts as of "wildness" and "naturalness' somehow
combine both objectively identifiable conditions and cultural
constructions. If so, then the question arises, what is the mode of
this "combination"?
This is a significant issue, for it goes to the heart of policies
of wilderness preservation, of land and aquatic restoration and
management, of species protection, as well as numerous other
environmental issues. This issue involves no less than the question,
"just what are we attempting to preserve, protect, and manage, and
how do we identify and assess success or failure in these
endeavors"?
At one extreme of this debate is Martin Krieger and his 1973 essay
which environmentalists love to hate, "What's Wrong with Plastic
Trees?" "What is considered a natural environment," writes Krieger,
"depends on the particular culture and society defining it.... A
wilderness may be viewed as a state of mind, as an attitude..."
(Krieger).
At the other extreme are what we might call "the John Muir
purists" who proclaim that "nature," far from being an "invention" of
human beings, is the independent progenitor of humanity. In the words
of Howard Zahniser, "out of wilderness [man] has fashioned
his civilization. It is the raw material of his culture." (Zahniser,
p. 346) Thus wilderness precedes and transcends culture, and is best
encountered "as it is - on its own terms."
Both extremes are mistaken, I believe, for the concepts of nature
and wildness and our understanding thereof necessarily combine an
objective and independent "material" with a subjective and culturally
constructed "form." Even Aldo Leopold recognized that an "immaculate
perception" of nature is a myth - that our encounter with nature is
colored by the life experiences and learned concepts that we bring to
it. "Daniel Boone's reaction [to nature] depended not only on
the quality of what he saw, but on the quality of the mental eye with
which he saw it. Ecological science has wrought a change in the
mental eye. It has disclosed origins and functions for what to Boone
were only facts. It has disclosed mechanisms for what to Boone were
only attributes.... We may safely say that, as compared with the
competent ecologist of the present day, Boone saw only the surface of
things..." (Leopold, p. 174).
Leopold's account suggests a distinction familiar to students of
the Philosophy of Science: namely, the distinction between, on the
one hand, the discovered "objective" and "independent" facts, and, on
the other hand, the "constructed" theories (or "models") that
organize and coordinate these "raw facts" to yield predictions and
confirmations. Thus science, by this (vastly oversimplified) account,
consists of both discoveries and inventions("constructs").
In a provocative paper just published, Reid Helford (1999) has
vividly illustrated the problem of "the social construction of
nature" as it arose in an attempt to "restore" in Illinois, the oak
savanna ecosystem which presumably existed there prior to European
settlement. As work on the restoration project continued, the project
managers came face to face with the problem of identifying the
ecosystem that presumably existed in pre-Columbian times (not, by the
way, a completely "natural" system, for it too was affected by the
native American inhabitants of the area). They found that they were
faced with a seemingly inseparable mix of an "objective" scientific
account of what that lost landscape "really" was, and their
preconceived notions of what a natural ecosystem "should be."
Eventually, they were faced with a remarkable paradox: if the
restored "natural" (therefore originally "unmanaged") ecosystem were
to survive, it would have to be intensively managed by the restorers
- e.g., by removing invading non-native species, and by simulating
natural processes such as predation and fire which for safety and
political considerations could not be allowed to occur "naturally."
What then remains of the "naturalness" of this restored "natural
landscape?"
The "Ecology Project" will therefore deal with such questions and
the following: In what sense and degree are the concepts of nature,
wilderness and ecosystem "objective" and culture-neutral, and to what
sense and degree are they socially constructed? Is an objectification
of these concepts possible, say through rigorous scientific
procedures? Is such objectification possible or even desirable in the
formulation and implementation of public environmental policy?
Identifying the concepts and presuppositions of environmental
policies.
As the title of this proposal indicates, there are two essential
"targets" of this investigation: the theories and concepts of
contemporary ecology, and concepts and assumptions regarding ecology
that are conspicuous in environmental policy and ethics.
The latter study (of policy and ethics) will not focus on the
scientific work or public opinion cited by policy-makers, but rather
upon what policy-makers perceive to be received expert and opinion
regarding ecological concepts and principles. These perceptions of
"the received wisdom" will be evident in the public pronouncements of
policy-makers, and in the consequences of these perceptions in
environmental laws and regulations.
This will be less an empirical than a philosophical
investigation-- less, that is to say, a search for origins of
environmental polices, than a search for their meanings,
presuppositions and implications. Rather than take policy
pronouncements, laws and regulations at face value, I will subject
them to conceptual analysis - distilling out defining characteristics
("criteria"), determining scopes of application, searching for
conceptual imperfections (e.g., vagueness, ambiguity and
contradiction), and explicating the unspoken and often unacknowledged
presuppositions that underlie environmental policies.
For example: When the Wilderness Act of 1964 speaks of a
"community of life," does this mean the "community" described by Aldo
Leopold? And when that same act states that a wilderness area is to
be "managed so as to preserve its natural conditions," is there a
contradiction here? What justifications are given for the Endangered
Species Act? How are such terms as "species," "ecosystem" and
"natural" employed in the language of that act. What ecological
theory is implicit in the language, justifications and provisions of
that act? Similar questions may be posed regarding the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1970, and other landmark environmental
legislation.
Through such analyses, I will attempt to identify and sketch
implicit (and often explicit) non-scientific ecological concepts and
theories in public environmental policy, laws, regulations and
practice. This will presumably include such notions as the "harmony,
balance and order" of "undisturbed nature" that drew Prof. Botkin's
critical fire (cf. above).
This task of analyzing policy language and content, separately
from our examination of contemporary ecological science, will be
essential to the general task of studying the "implications of
disequilibrium ecology for environmental ethics and policy."
This will not be an exercise in apologetics. There will be no
search for "props" to justify preconceived notions and foregone
conclusions. This Investigator is genuinely uncertain as to the
outcome of the investigation. While a preliminary position statement
is soon to be published ("Reconstructing Ecology"), that paper is
critical of both "edges" of the spectrum of ecological thought. If I
were somehow to read today the book that will result from this
investigation two years hence, I would no doubt be astonished and
informed by what I read.
Recapitulation of the essential theme and objective of the
project.
Public environmental policy, laws, and regulations that have been
enacted within the past thirty years, and a growing body of opinion
in environmental ethics, utilize a "received" vocabulary of concepts
and assume an implicit theory of ecology - a conception of
"undisturbed nature," and of balanced and self-regulating life
communities. Many contemporary ecologists contend that these concepts
and this view of life systems is no longer tenable - that change
rather than stasis and equilibrium, and chaos rather than system and
order, characterize biotic regions. Furthermore, some philosophical
critics (e.g., Mark Sagoff) contend that "theoretical ecology" is
less a science than an ideology, for its pronouncements are vague and
non-falsifiable, it lacks an objective classification system, and it
can establish no "baselines" from which to establish and calibrate
deviations.
Are these criticisms supported or refuted by the "mainstream" of
contemporary ecological science." Do these criticisms undermine large
segments of environmental ethical thought (in particular
"organismic," "holistic" and "community" models, following such
thinkers as Whitehead, the Odum brothers and Leopold)? And finally,
can established environmental policy and law, based upon the
so-called "received ecological wisdom," be supported and sustained in
the face of new developments in the science of ecology - the very
science which is believed by environmental policy-makers, activists
and journalists, to be the foundation of environmental policy and
law?
These are the questions that will guide this investigation.
ENDNOTES
1. A fourth "task" was removed from the
project, at the recommendation of the referees: "Search for and
develop "avenues" of effective influence from the controlled,
precise, quantified and value-neutral investigations of professional
ecological scientists, on the one hand, to integrative scholars
(philosophers, political scientists, economists), journalists,
policy-makers, environmental activists, and eventually the interested
public, on the other hand." This remains a worthy project, which
might be pursued after the conclusion of the grant.
2. If
a is a
criterion of some thing X, then if a is absent from some thing Y,
word "X" does not apply to Y - i.e., the Y is not an X. However, if
the criteria set a, b, c...n is complete,
then if some thing Y meets all criteria, Y is an X, and the word "X"
correctly applies to thing Y. (Albritten, 1959; Kenny, 1967; Scriven,
1959). This, however, formally describes ideal conditions. In fact,
as Wittgenstein pointed out, for many concepts and meanings in
ordinary language there is no simple list of sufficient criteria.
Members of such classes have "family resemblances" - sharing a number
of traits, but not all
3. I use the word "bioregion" to refer to an
area containing life forms - nothing more. This stipulated definition
does not involve "system" as a defining characteristic, so as to
avoid begging the question on the side of "the old ecology."
4. In Frank B. Golley's otherwise helpful and
informative book, A History of the Ecosystem Concept in
Ecology, (1993) I found no explicit analyses of
ecosystem, system, or equilibrium.
However, Golley suggests some criteria of ecosystems that will prove
useful in the analysis which follows below.
5. "Old ecologists" variously suggests that
such a self-regulating mechanism might be the species diversity
(MacArthur, 1955, 534), negative feedback loops (E. Odum, 1959,
45-6), and the energy efficiency characteristic of mature ecosystems
(Margalef, 1963). Unfortunately for this theory, recent studies have
put the diversity-stability theory in question (Grime, Science, 1997,
1260). All are topics worthy of further investigation -- provided, or
course, they are falsifiable in principle.
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